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ABSTRACT
When and why do electoral candidates politicize ethnicity? From the literature, we
might expect this behaviour to occur during democratic transitions or under
proportional rules. However, empirical support for these arguments is mixed. This
article presents a new approach, arguing that candidate-centric rules offer
candidates incentives to politicize ethnicity. The argument is tested in Indonesia
with empirical evidence drawn from coding newspaper reports on campaign events,
endorsements and group appeals. Indonesia used party-centric rules from 1997 to
2004, and even though the country democratized during this period, the
politicization of ethnicity actually declined. I show how party-centric rules, coupled
with a national economic crisis, encouraged candidates to campaign on broad
national platforms of reform and development, thereby appealing to the poor rather
than to ethnic groups. Between 2004 and 2009, the system became more
candidate-centric and the politicization of ethnicity increased. I argue that changes
in the system freed candidates from national party platforms and motivated them
to campaign on their local connections with ethnic groups. This study is particularly
pertinent amidst the push for direct candidate-centric elections in the developing
world and the lack of literature on how such rules could affect ethnic politics.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 3 November 2017; Accepted 25 March 2018
KEYWORDS Democratization; democracy; election campaigns; ethnicity; ethnic mobilization; electoral rules;
personal vote; Indonesia
Introduction
In multi-ethnic societies, election campaigns can be contentious affairs. Their effect on
inter-ethnic relations can be particularly acute, as politicians’ campaign methods fre-
quently sharpen ethnic divisions, reducing elections to zero-sum struggles for power
and domination between increasingly hostile ethnic groups. When and why do elections
become ethnicized, and under what conditions do candidates choose to politicize
ethnicity?
The most prominent answer to this question focuses on the nature of transitional
elections in ethnically diverse countries. It argues that in an environment with weak
institutions, strong ethnic bonds, and nascent partisan attachment, candidates can
bolster support by appealing to voters’ emotional allegiances to their tribe, language
© 2018 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
CONTACT Colm Fox colmfox@smu.edu.sg
Supplemental data for this article can be accessed https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2018.1461207
DEMOCRATIZATION, 2018
https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2018.1461207
group, region or religion. Such appeals often ethnicize transitional democratic elections,
making them particularly divisive and prone to violence.1
However, the present article shows that this argument cannot explain patterns of
ethnic campaigning in Indonesia, one of the largest and most ethnically diverse democ-
racies in the world. Analysing empirical evidence from a content analysis of pre-election
newspaper reports in an ethnically diverse region of Indonesia between 1997 and 2014, I
show that the politicization of ethnicity actually declined during the election campaign
of 1999, which marked a democratic transition. Candidates in this election emphasized
national economic development and government reform, rarely appealing to religious
or indigenous identities. This pattern changed in 2009 when candidates began to
mobilize the support of local religious, indigenous and community groups in their elec-
tion campaigns. Why did Indonesian candidates downplay ethnicity in the transitional
election in 1999, but more overtly rally ethnic support since 2009?
To explain this pattern, I draw on insights from the personal vote literature, putting
forward an institutional argument to explain changes in ethnic campaigning. This lit-
erature has shown that electoral rules can affect how candidates campaign. Specifically,
when candidates need personal votes, they are more likely to campaign on personal
attributes, their constituency service, and local agendas, whereas in other situations
they campaign on the party label and national issues.2
In 1997 and 1999, Indonesia used a closed-list proportional representation (PR) elec-
toral system. These rules gave political party leaders considerable power over candidates
and offered candidates strong incentives to promote the political party, voice the party
line and campaign on prominent national issues. Because Indonesia’s democratic tran-
sition had been sparked by a devastating financial crisis and pent-up grievances over
rampant government corruption, the key national issues were economic development
and government reform. As a result, candidates’ campaign activity in 1999 consisted
largely of party rallies at which they stood loyally alongside party leaders and promoted
democratic development, a tough stance on corruption, and economic development.
Where they did aim their appeals at any population segment, candidates largely targeted
those most affected by the financial crisis – that is, the poor – more than any particular
indigenous or religious groups.
Between 2004 and 2009, there was a shift from party-centric to candidate-centric
rules for legislative elections – specifically, a change from closed-list PR to open-list
PR. Candidates now had to compete for personal votes to get elected. This shift to a
candidate-centric system had a dramatic impact on campaigns. From the literature,
we would expect candidate-centric rules to create incentives for candidates to empha-
size their personal attributes and constituency service, and they did. But beyond that,
candidate-centric elections also encouraged candidates to appeal to local ethnic and
community groups. The evidence indicates that they increasingly attended smaller
ethnic-group campaign events rather than large party rallies, campaigned with local
ethnic leaders rather than party leaders, crafted more ethnic appeals, and switched
the focus of their messages from the platforms and performance of parties to their
own personal traits, experience and service.
Although candidate-centred elections can forge tighter connections between con-
stituents and their representatives, thus increasing accountability, this research shows
that it can also increase the politicization of local ethnic groups. Even though
Pomper observed a similar phenomenon in the United States (US) in the 1960s, the
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ways in which candidate-centric rules shape ethnic politics have been overlooked in the
literature on ethnic politics and democracy.3
The politicization of ethnicity
Why do candidates politicize ethnicity in elections? A simple answer is that it works or,
at a minimum, that they believe they can mobilize some support from their ethnic kin
through such appeals. The literature on ethnic politics offers a range of explanations as
to why elections and, more broadly, politics might be organized along ethnic lines. One
explanation emphasizes people’s strong psychological attachments to their ethnic kin
and the tendency of ethnic groups to try to improve their status and self-esteem by
dominating and denigrating other ethnic groups. In this competitive world, it is not
just self-esteem but the very survival of ethnic groups that is at stake, making it easy
for politicians to mobilize the electorate for ethnic voting and other forms of divisive
behaviour.4
A second view contends that ethnic groups are motivated not by self-esteem but by
differing cultural or social values; for example, ethnic groups want to speak their own
language, attend their own schools and have public policies tailored to their specific
needs and values.5 According to a third view, ethnic groups are not motivated by
status concerns or differing values, but by the pursuit of scarce material resources,
such as jobs, government contracts, handouts and subsidies. Ethnicity, in this view,
often plays an important coordinating and informational role in the pursuit of scarce
resources.6
Although group status, differing values, and competition over resources can all drive
ethnic mobilization, there are particular times and contexts when these root causes
become most acute. Critical junctures – times of abrupt structural shocks such as econ-
omic collapse, social upheaval, regime change and war – are associated with the politi-
cization of ethnicity and are particularly detrimental to inter-ethnic relations.7 These
turning points can alter inter-group power relations, intensify contestation over differ-
ing cultural values, and increase competition over policy and access to resources.
Many scholars have focused on transitions to democracy as a major critical juncture
and found that such junctures trigger ethnic mobilization and conflict. Snyder and
Mansfield, who have done the most prominent work in this area, connect democratiza-
tion with the politicization of nationalism and ethnicity through the actions of aspiring
politicians. In emerging democracies with weak institutions, politicians have strong
incentives to use belligerent ethnic and nationalist rhetoric to mobilize electoral
support along ethnic lines. Although this rhetoric helps politicians to attain support,
it also increases the risk of ethno-nationalist conflict.8 Other scholars have reported
similar findings. During transitions to democracy in multi-ethnic states in Africa,
Asia and the former Soviet Union, Reilly highlighted the emergence of ethno-nationalist
parties – that is, parties that drew their support from one ethnic group or region and
espoused nationalist or separatist agendas.9 Meanwhile, several works have linked
democratization with ethno-nationalist mobilization and ethnic conflict in multi-
ethnic countries.10 In sum, this literature suggests that during transitions to democracy
in multi-ethnic countries, a common way to gain voters’ support is to appeal to their
fears and turn electoral politics into a competition between ethnic groups. The main
problem with this argument is that many multi-ethnic countries have successfully tran-
sitioned to democracy without much ethnic contestation.11
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Overall, much of the ethnic politics literature draws a direct line from the politiciza-
tion of ethnicity to inter-ethnic contestation or ethnic conflict. However, the use of eth-
nicity in election campaigns is often more subtle and less divisive. In fact, it can be quite
inclusive when candidates reach out to multiple ethnic groups. As a result, this article
conceptualizes the politicization of ethnicity during campaigns in a more neutral
fashion. It involves the use of campaign messages, signals, or activities by candidates
to invoke ethnicity. Moreover, in politicizing ethnicity, candidates may invoke their
own ethnicity or reach out across ethnic groups by appealing to ethnic categories
they do not belong to.
The politicization of ethnicity and candidate-centric systems
This article focuses on the constraints and incentives that aspiring candidates face. It
draws on the personal vote literature, which takes a methodologically individualist
approach. It places candidates at the centre of the analysis and has shown that the elec-
toral system affects candidate behaviour in predictable ways. Electoral systems range
from candidate- to party-centric, and various electoral rules can cause the system to
lean one way or the other. For example, nonpartisan rules and open-list PR make it
more candidate-centric, whereas closed-list PR makes it more party-centric.12
Under candidate-centric electoral rules, the candidate’s personal reputation is most
important and voters are most concerned with the candidate’s character, responsiveness
and ability to meet their needs. Candidates in this situation enjoy greater independence
in how they campaign and have strong incentives to use personal vote strategies,
tending to highlight their personal attributes, develop close relationships with constitu-
ents, pursue particularistic policies and engage in pork-barrel politics.13 Under party-
centric rules, on the other hand, the party’s reputation is more important and what
matters most to voters is the standing, ideology and platform of the candidate’s
party. Voters want to know about parties, not the individual candidate. Therefore, can-
didates have less independence as to how they campaign and strong incentives to toe the
party line. They are also less closely connected with constituents and they primarily
promote their political party and broader programmatic policies.
Most of these findings come from developed countries such as the US, and the
studies have not explicitly looked at the effect of candidate-centric rules on ethnic poli-
tics. However, some research suggests that candidate-centric rules might have an
important effect on ethnic politics in the developing world. We know that candidate-
centric elections offer strong incentives for pork-barrel spending. We also know that,
in many developing countries, pork-barrel spending is frequently distributed along
ethnic lines.14 Combining these two insights suggests that candidate-centric elections
could exacerbate an already ethnicized politics of pork, increasing the salience and poli-
ticization of ethnic identities.
Pomper offers some empirical evidence that connects candidate-centric rules and the
politicization of ethnicity. He compared partisan (party-centric) and nonpartisan (can-
didate-centric) municipal elections in the US, finding that under candidate-centric
rules, the candidates were responsible for financing and organizing their own cam-
paigns. Untethered from the party label, they more frequently engaged in ethnic mobil-
ization to attain support, campaigning through ethnic associations such as Italian social
organizations, black churches and local ethnic media. This pattern ultimately resulted in
higher levels of ethnic voting.15
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Making a distinction between candidate-centric and party-centric electoral systems
can help us to understand candidates’ ethnic campaign strategy. Under party-centric
rules, a candidate’s campaign strategy is largely dictated from above, that is, by the pol-
itical party. Candidates have strong incentives to appease party leaders, promote the
party’s reputation and platform, and target partisan voters. In contrast, under candi-
date-centric rules, candidates have more freedom to control their campaigns and
tend to look below, that is, to their constituents. They have strong incentives to
promote their personal reputation and to mobilize members of organized groups at
the local community level.
These incentives result in different campaign strategies. Under party-centric rules,
candidates’ campaigns emphasize their connection to the political party along with
the party’s performance, platform, ideology, and the quality of leadership. They
engage in party rallies with leaders and other candidates, seek endorsements from
regional and national party leaders, and make verbal appeals to the party faithful.
Under candidate-centric rules, candidates appeal directly to members of organized
local groups. Depending on the society, these groups may be ethnic or non-ethnic.
However, in many multi-ethnic democracies around the world, ethnic groups are the
most organized and salient groups at the local level, with the result that candidates
have strong incentives to appeal to ethnicity. Campaign strategies in these contexts
stress ethnic identity, character, work experience, local community service, and per-
sonal connections with local groups and institutions. Candidates also organize more
intimate campaign events with particular ethnic and community associations, seek
endorsements from the leaders of these entities, and verbally emphasize their support
for such groups. Appealing to local groups and emphasizing personal attributes helps
to establish a personal reputation as responsive and builds trust with the group targeted.
For an illustration of this argument, see Figure 1.
Of course, candidates can and do use both types of appeals in their campaigns.
However, I contend that they will place greater emphasis on party-centred campaign
strategies when the rules are highly party-centric. Conversely, as the rules become
more candidate-centric, candidates will de-emphasize the party; in addition to promot-
ing their personal attributes, they direct their campaigns towards organized (and often
ethnic) groups at the local level.
Institutional change in Indonesia
Indonesia is a particularly good place to test this theoretical argument for two reasons.
First, it is an ethnically diverse country where attachments to religious and indigenous
ethnic groups are particularly salient. Second, Indonesia has experienced two significant
institutional changes in the last two decades: a transition to democracy in 1999 and a
shift from a party-centric to a candidate-centric system between 2004 and 2009. Study-
ing the politicization of ethnicity through these time periods can illuminate the impact
of both democratization and candidate-centric rules.
Historically, Indonesia’s electoral system has been party-centric and controlled by
one hegemonic party: Golkar. After gaining independence from the Dutch, Indonesia
had a brief period of democracy, holding its first democratic election in 1955.
However, the election and subsequent efforts by President Sukarno did not ease the
increasingly hostile political competition between Indonesia’s main rival factions.
After an attempted coup in 1965 and an anti-communist purge, the country slid into
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a long era of authoritarianism under a military general: Suharto. Six national elections
were held during Suharto’s autocratic rule between 1971 and 1997. In these elections,
competition was restricted to three parties: an Islamic party (Partai Persatuan Pemban-
gunan, or PPP), a secular-nationalist party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia or PDI), and
the governing party (Golkar). The elections were merely a façade, however, because a
sophisticated system of electoral manipulation and intimidation ensured Golkar’s con-
tinued domination. These elections were also quite party-centric, following a closed-list
PR formula under which seats won by a party were allocated to candidates in the elec-
toral district according to their order on the list. This arrangement allowed party leaders
to control which of their candidates would get seats, fostering party discipline and
loyalty.16
In the second half of 1997, the Asian financial crisis hit Indonesia. Amidst the flight
of capital, a plummeting rupiah, mass demonstrations and riots, Suharto was forced to
resign. Accounts claim that Suharto’s regime fell because the corrupt system supporting
it collapsed due to internal forces and external pressures from a student-led democracy
movement.17
In the wake of this dramatic change, democratic elections were held in 1999. They
allowed for genuine multiparty competition but remained party-centric, using the
same closed-list PR formula. Over 40 new parties formed and competed in the 1999
election and the subsequent one in April 2004; most of these were secular-nationalist
or moderate Islamic parties.18
The next major change in the legislative electoral rules came in 2009, when the elec-
toral system went from a closed-list PR system to a full open-list PR system.19 This
Incentives
Enhance personal 
reputation
Target 
local group members
Promote personal attributes
Emphasize local group connections
Attend local group events 
Get local group leader support 
Make local group appeals
Highly
candidate-centric
Electoral system
Campaigns
Enhance party 
reputation 
Target
party supporters
Highly
party-centric
Promote party performance 
Emphasize party connections 
Attend party rallies 
Get party leader support
Make partisan appeals
Party-centric strategies Candidate-centric strategies
Figure 1. Party-centric and candidate-centric electoral systems and campaign strategies.
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meant that seats won by a party in a given electoral district were allocated to the can-
didates in that district who received the greatest number of votes. These elections were
more candidate-centric because candidates competed against others from their own
party for personal votes in order to win a seat.
These changes offer an ideal opportunity to test the impact of institutional change
on the politicization of ethnicity during Indonesia’s legislative elections. First, we can
compare the authoritarian 1997 election campaign with the transitional 1999 elec-
tion, which occurred rather quickly after Suharto’s demise and before major consti-
tutional changes were enacted. In this environment of weak democratic institutions,
we would expect candidates and parties to politicize ethnicity.20 Second, we can
compare the party-centric 1997–2004 campaigns with the candidate-centric 2009
and 2014 campaigns (Table 1). If my argument is correct, we should see a change
in campaign strategies towards higher levels of ethnic politicization under candi-
date-centric rules.
Studying election campaigns and ethnic politics in Indonesia
In systematic studies, ethnic voting patterns are often used to measure ethnic politiciza-
tion.21 While they can offer valuable insights on how voters vote, they provide no infor-
mation on the appeals made by candidates in elections. We must assume from voting
patterns that candidates actively politicized ethnicity in some way if their support comes
overwhelmingly from a certain group. While less common, systematic studies on how
candidates campaign allow us to identify specific instances when candidates actively
politicize ethnicity. The advantage of these studies is that they help us uncover what
might drive ethnic politicization in the first place.
To study how candidates campaign I draw data from regional newspaper reports on
campaigns in the province of North Sumatra between 1997 and 2014. This empirical
strategy offers several advantages. First, pre-election regional newspaper reports offer
extensive, detailed information on local candidates’ and party campaigns that can be
compared over time.22 Previous studies in other parts of the world have shown that a
content analysis of these pre-election reports can uncover a wealth of detailed infor-
mation on election campaigns, such as the location of campaign events, candidate
endorsements, appeals to ethnic groups, the salience of candidate attributes, and the
prevalence of particular issues.23 In addition, pre-election reports in regional Indone-
sian papers tend to faithfully reflect the positive image and appeals that candidates
and parties want to project. The reports contain little editorial comment, political analy-
sis or critique; in fact, they are often written by or in conjunction with candidates and
campaign managers.24 The newspapers have a financial motivation to engage with can-
didates and publish these positive, uncritical reports because candidates and parties will
Table 1. Institutional change and campaign expectations in Indonesia.
Electoral system
Party-centric system Candidate-centric system
(Closed-list PR) (Open-list PR)
Elections, regimes, and party systems 1997 1999 and 2004 2009 and 2014
Authoritarian Democratic Democratic
Hegemonic party Multiparty Multiparty
Campaigns Party-centric strategies Candidate-centric strategies
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often buy and freely distribute large numbers of copies, thereby providing much-needed
extra revenue for the newspaper.25
Second, in terms of the region, North Sumatra is a particularly good place to study
ethnic politics, as it is one of the more ethnically diverse provinces in Indonesia and has
rich ethnic traditions.26 Islam is the majority religion, claiming 66% of the population,
but there is a large Protestant minority (27%) as well as smaller numbers of Catholics,
Buddhists, and Hindus. Ethnicity is even more fragmented among a number of Batak
indigenous groups as well as the Javanese, Malay, and Indonesian Chinese, with no
dominant group. As in other parts of Indonesia, religion and indigeneity are salient
forms of identity in the people’s daily lives and inter-ethnic relations. Social life often
revolves around indigenous and religious rituals, ceremonies, prayer groups, and festi-
vals,27 and occasionally inter-ethnic tensions come to the fore. In 1998, protests calling
for reform turned into riots that targeted the Chinese minority in the capital city of
Medan by looting their shops.28 Christian churches’ attempts to acquire operating
permits have also been a source of tension, and in recent years some churches have
been burned down.
A final advantage of this approach is that it offers some control over potentially miti-
gating local and regional factors. Both the data source and regional variables are held
constant over time, allowing us to test how changes in the institutions have affected
campaigns.
North Sumatra has historically had a vibrant and independent regional press, with
several major newspapers published in Medan.29 After surveying these newspapers, I
selected Waspada for my in-depth study. Waspada is the longest-running daily
paper in the region, broadly popular across indigenous and religious groups in North
Sumatra and well known for its extensive local election coverage. In addition, it had
the same owner throughout the study period. Print versions of Waspada’s pre-election
reports were gathered from archives in Indonesia and the US on the last five legislative
elections (1997, 1999, 2004, 2009 and 2014). Every pre-election report in the three
weeks preceding each election was photographed and stored digitally in a database.
This three-week window was chosen because the bulk of reports on the campaigns
were published during this time. The articles that qualified as pre-election reports
included paid advertorials on candidates’ and parties’ campaigns, reports on campaign
events (party rallies, community events, door-to-door campaigns, and so on), and inter-
views with local party leaders and candidates.
I composed a comprehensive codebook for coding the reports during eight months
of fieldwork in Medan. In developing the codebook, I consulted with research assistants,
experts on the local media, constituents, campaign managers and journalists on
interpretation of the reports and on the use of ethnic campaign appeals. Using a
simple random sampling technique, I read and coded every second report. The substan-
tive coding involved identifying references to (1) campaign events, (2) elite support or
endorsements, and (3) explicit appeals to particular social groups.30
With regard to the first of these categories, reports usually focused on one campaign
event, such as a political rally, a meeting with an indigenous youth group, or a candi-
date’s participation in a community-level mosquito eradication event. Second, endorse-
ments were defined broadly for coding purposes; there were some explicit and official
endorsements by associations and elites, but implicit support in the form of attendance
by particular elites and institutional leaders at a candidate’s campaign event was more
common. Finally, explicit appeals to ethnic and non-ethnic social groups were defined
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as a candidate’s positive statement of support or admiration for a particular group. For
such an instance to be coded, the candidate had to mention the group by name or use a
term closely related to the group.
For purposes of analysis, each aspect of a campaign (that is, a religious event, indi-
genous event, religious endorsement, or so on) was stored as a binary variable, equal to
1 if present in a report and 0 if not. This method allowed me to see how campaigns
changed from one election to the next. For example, I could calculate whether the per-
centage of reports describing religious-related campaign events increased or declined
over time. I used these data and insights from the reports to assess whether and how
democratization and a candidate-centric system affected the politicization of ethnicity.
Democratization and the lack of ethnic politicization
To study the impact of democratization, Table 2 compares data from the 1997 author-
itarian election campaign and the 1999 transitional election. The 1997 and 1999 figures
indicate the percentage of reports that mentioned (at least once) a religious or indigen-
ous event, endorsement or group appeal. The figure for “Change” represents the per-
centage of increase or decrease in 1999 relative to 1997. If democratization had a
politicizing impact on ethnicity, we should see an increase in these percentages, but
that is not the case. With the exception of religious events, the figures indicate a
decline in each of the categories examined.
If candidates and parties were not mobilizing ethnic and religious groups in signifi-
cant ways, how were they campaigning for support? In terms of events, large political
rallies and street parades (pawai), prominent during the authoritarian years, were the
most common type of campaign event, particularly for the larger parties. Similar to pre-
vious elections, at these events constituents were entertained with popular music and
dangdut (a genre of Indonesian music); given free gifts such as party T-shirts, pens
and staple foods; and introduced to the party’s new candidates. In terms of endorse-
ments, local religious, indigenous or community elites played little or no role; rather,
regional and national party leaders voiced support for the party and their candidates.
The 1999 election, which occurred amidst the pain of a devastating financial crisis,
did exhibit a shift in the kinds of appeals made. Candidates and party leaders from an
array of new parties spent much of their time criticizing Golkar and its leadership,
emphasizing the need for democracy to flourish, calling for political reform, and prom-
ising to stamp out corruption once and for all. When candidates did make identity-
group appeals, they often appealed to working-class occupational groups and the
poor, those most affected by the financial crisis. In these appeals, they emphasized
issues of social justice: they appealed to fishermen by criticizing the large fishing com-
panies, to farmers by proposing land reform, and to labourers by arguing that wages
were too low and that the government had continually ignored workers and their rights.
Table 2. Democratization and the change in religious and indigenous aspects of campaigns in reports.
Religious Indigenous
1997 (%) 1999 (%) Change (%) 1997 (%) 1999 (%) Change (%)
Events 6.3 6.8 0.6 3.1 0.0 −3.1
Endorsements 7.8 4.1 −3.7 3.1 0.0 −3.1
Group appeals 40.6 31.5 −9.1 6.3 4.1 −2.1
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While many new parties formed for the 1999 elections, the new party system, to
some degree, reflected the system from the 1950s – one that was rooted in traditional
sociocultural divides or what is termed aliran (streams) in the Indonesian literature.31
In 1999, the political parties were largely divided in terms of their views on the role of
Islam, with the main cleavage between nationalist and Islamic parties. Candidates in
these parties toed the party line and their appeals corresponded with their party’s orien-
tation; for example, Islamic appeals were almost totally limited to the Islamic party can-
didates, whereas the nationalist party candidates occasionally used nationalist appeals
but eschewed explicit religious appeals.
Overall, there is no evidence of an increase in the politicization of religious or indi-
genous groups during the transitional election of 1999. This finding is all the more strik-
ing when one considers the swiftness with which the transitional election was held –
before democratic institution building and constitutional reform, and under a cloud
of serious ethnic conflicts in various parts of Indonesia. The events, endorsements
and rhetoric of the 1999 campaign suggest that the context of the election (held
during a severe national financial crisis) and the use of party-centric rules were impor-
tant factors in shaping campaigns and mitigating ethnic politicization. The parties and
candidates continued to engage in large party rallies, and national party leaders played
prominent roles focusing their campaigns on the immediate issues of poverty, corrup-
tion and political reform, basing their appeals on economic interests rather than ethnic
identities.
Candidate-centric systems and the rise in ethnic politicization
To study the impact of a candidate-centric system, I compared campaigns before and
after 2009 (see Table 3). The first column of figures presents the total percentage of
reports from the three party-centric elections (1997–2004) that mention a type of
event, endorsement, group appeal or candidate attribute. The second column presents
the data for the candidate-centric 2009–2014 reports. The “Change” column shows
whether these percentages rose or declined. In line with the argument, the data show
a rise in religious and indigenous events, endorsements and group appeals, plus com-
munity events and endorsements after the shift to candidate-centric rules. To test for
statistical significance, I performed separate binomial logit regressions on each depen-
dent variable (religious event, indigenous event, and so on), with an individual report as
the unit of analysis. The values in the last three columns present the estimate, its stan-
dard error, and the odds ratio for the independent variable candidate-centric rules
(equal to 1 for open-list PR elections, held in 2009 and 2014, and 0 for the previous elec-
tions). With the exception of appeals to religious groups, the rise in all indigenous and
community-oriented aspects of campaigns was statistically significant.
In contrast to the minimal effects of democratization, the shift towards a more can-
didate-centric system had a sweeping impact on campaigns, and in particular on the
politicization of ethnicity. One of the biggest changes in election campaigns was a
move from large party rallies in 1997–2004 to smaller campaign events with commu-
nity-based, indigenous and religious groups in 2009 and 2014. The number of constitu-
ents attending these events tended to range from 20 up to a few hundred – far fewer
than the numbers at the mass rallies. Community group visits were the most
common type of event in 2009 and 2014. In these events, candidates typically visited
a neighbourhood and spoke with a small group of residents.32 They also frequently
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used community service and sports events as campaign opportunities. There were many
reports of candidates providing free mobile medical care to poor neighbourhoods,
hosting sports events or working with residents to fumigate areas of mosquitos, clean
ditches and plant trees.
The frequency of campaign trips to meet local religious and indigenous groups also
rose in 2009 and 2014, relative to the earlier elections. Candidates attended indigenous
ceremonies, dances and music events; engaged in rituals such as receiving the tra-
ditional indigenous Batak cloth (ulos); and occasionally were accepted into the indigen-
ous group by receiving a clan name (marga). Candidates also met with religious groups.
They paid visits to women’s Islamic groups, religious youth groups, Islamic schools,
mosques and church congregations. Activities involved prayers, readings from the
Koran, discussions of the group’s needs, and promises of financial support. The
reports on indigenous and religious events were often accompanied by photos of the
candidate meeting the group while wearing their indigenous or religious clothing.
Overall, the mass rallies that had been a staple of Indonesian campaigns became less
prominent. With the shift to a more candidate-centric system, most campaign activity
now involves smaller events that often target local ethnic and community groups.
Since 2009, a far more diverse range of local elites, associations, and groups have
come out to endorse candidates. The percentage of reports that mentioned support
Table 3. Change in campaigns after a move to a candidate-centric system.
% of reports Logit regression results
1997–2004 (%) 2009–2014 (%) Change (%) Estimate Odds ratio SE
Events
Party 66 23 −42.4 −1.84** 0.16 (0.24)
Religious 5 11 6.2 0.89* 2.44 (0.41)
Indigenous 1 9 7.7 2.26** 9.60 (0.76)
Community 7 27 19.2 1.52** 4.58 (0.32)
Occupational 1 2 1.0 0.53 1.70 (0.77)
Other 3 1 −1.7 −0.88 0.41 (0.82)
None 21 35 13.6 0.69** 1.99 (0.24)
Endorsements
Party 46 11 −35 −1.91** 0.15 (0.29)
Religious 5 12 7 0.91* 2.48 (0.39)
Indigenous 1 9 8 2.34** 10.36 (0.76)
Community 4 14 9 1.23** 3.42 (0.41)
Occupational 2 4 2 0.59 1.81 (0.60)
Other 8 8 0 0.03 1.03 (0.39)
None 45 56 11 0.45* 1.57 (0.21)
Group appeals
Religious 29 35 5.9 0.27 1.31 (0.23)
Indigenous 4 11 7.2 1.12* 3.08 (0.44)
Occupational 31 19 −12.1 −0.65** 0.52 (0.25)
The poor 20 17 −2.7 −0.18 0.84 (0.27)
Other 20 24 4.1 0.24 1.27 (0.25)
None 31 29 −2.2 −0.10 0.90 (0.23)
*p < 0.05.
**p < 0.01.
^p < 0.10.
Note: Some reports contained multiple types of events, endorsements, appeals, or candidate attributes, and there-
fore the total of the percentages can exceed 100%. N = 367 (205 reports were coded in the 1997–2004 elections
and 162 in the 2009–2014 elections). Estimates are logit coefficients and standard errors are for the estimates.
See the supplementary materials for the full regression output.
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from local religious leaders and associations more than doubled in the 2009–2014
period, while indigenous support increased almost tenfold. To secure support from
these groups, candidates visited local religious and indigenous leaders, Islamic and indi-
genous youth associations, Islamic schools and foundations, and local mosques. Seeking
support from Islamic women’s groups – small groups of local women who often meet
for Islamic recitation – also became a popular tactic in 2009 and 2014. Notably, the
nationalist (non-Islamic) party candidates were the ones primarily adopting this strat-
egy. Compared to previous years, indigenous elite support was much more diverse, with
elites representing Gayo, Batak Pakpak, Batak Mandailing, Batak Karo, Minangkabau,
Javanese and Indonesian Chinese groups.
The percentage of reports that mentioned candidate support from community
associations and leaders increased almost fourfold in the 2009 and 2014 elections. Com-
munity groups were involved in various aspects of local development, including the
environment, health, education and sports. Candidates also reached out to local
social associations, especially alumni groups from local high schools and universities
in Medan. In addition, support from occupational groups was no longer confined to
civil service associations but also came from leaders in various other occupations,
including pensioners, teachers, agricultural workers and transportation workers.
The 2009 and 2014 reports also specifically named the elites who supported and
actively engaged with candidates – for example, at community service events. This ten-
dency was in particularly sharp contrast with the 1997 election reports, in which elites
were passive bystanders at rallies, identified simply as community, youth, religious, or
indigenous leaders rather than by name. This change was not due to a sudden improve-
ment in journalism, but because candidates actively sought to highlight the support of a
particular local figure. Overall, with the shift to a candidate-centric system, candidates
relied less on party leaders for support and instead sought support from a more diverse
range of local elites and associations, the most prominent of these being local commu-
nity, religious and indigenous bodies.
The main impact of the move to a candidate-centric system on candidate outreach
strategies has been a rise in religious and indigenous appeals and a decline in appeals to
occupational groups. In 2009 and 2014, religious (specifically Islamic) appeals by both
Islamic and nationalist party candidates have increased. In addition, the percentage of
reports invoking indigenous groups has increased threefold, with candidates appealing
to a wider range of indigenous groups. Candidates usually emphasized their personal
connection to the group or highlighted the importance of preserving the group’s
culture and traditions. Meanwhile, there has been a decline in appeals to class-based
groups, specifically occupational and marginalized groups, which was particularly
stark when compared to the salience of class during the 1999 campaign. Notably,
appeals to women have increased in recent years. This rise can partly be attributed to
more female candidates taking part in elections,33 more exposure in the press34 and
more strenuous efforts by candidates to secure women’s votes through campaign
visits to women’s prayer groups.
One striking change clearly illustrated the shift in election coverage from parties to
candidates. Beginning in 2009, news reports have invariably contained a candidate’s
name; previously, they used the party name. From 1997 to 2004, news articles generally
described party rallies and extensively quoted party leaders on their party’s platform
and past achievements. But from 2009 onwards, the narrative of election reports has
been driven by individual candidates’ identity, character, work experience and
12 C. FOX
constituent service. Candidates have increasingly referred to their local indigenous
identity in these reports, which frequently depict them as dressed in traditional or indi-
genous clothing. It has also become commonplace for local candidates to claim that
people need a Putra Daerah (“son of the region”) representative in the legislature. Com-
pared to the “Jakarta drop-ins” (that is, people who live primarily in the capital), can-
didates who are natives of and still live in the region can develop stronger local
connections, which can help to increase their personal support. Candidates’ character
has become a prominent theme, with many portraying themselves as humble, compas-
sionate, empathetic, honest and hardworking individuals. More column inches are
dedicated to candidates’ professional achievements and work experience – for
example, their leadership roles in political, business, ethnic and non-ethnic organiz-
ations, or their work experience in specific professions such as law, education or medi-
cine. Finally, many reports described candidates’ personal efforts to help constituents,
such as providing legal and medical care for individual residents or delivering personal
assistance to earthquake and flood victims.
Overall, the move to a candidate-centric system has been accompanied by a rise in
appeals to local religious, indigenous and community groups. In addition, candidates
rather than parties have become the main protagonists in election reports, which pay
much closer attention to their individual identity, character, experience and constituent
service.35
To conclude this section, two important points need to be made on the positive
nature of candidates’ campaigns and their use of patronage. While the tone of
appeals was not explicitly coded, it became clear during the analysis that candidate
messages were largely positive and that candidates avoided any negative appeals
against particular ethnic groups. Moreover, it was common for candidates to visit,
get endorsed by, and appeal to ethnic groups they did not belong to. In a country
where indigeneity and religion are an important part of social life, these small ethnic
and community events provided candidates with an opportunity to interact with
voters from their own, and from other, ethnic groups. There, they promoted their
image and disseminated affect-based messages, keying into the expressive or physic
aspect of voting.36 However, candidates’ need for personal votes has also provided
voters with the leverage to extract material benefits from candidates at these events.
Aspinall argues that with the switch to open-list PR, voters have increasingly demanded
material benefits for themselves or their communities and that small campaign events
provide voters with an ideal opportunity to ask for, or receive, individual or collective
gifts.37 With the introduction of candidate-centric elections, ethnic and community
groups are increasingly serving as prominent social networks through which candidates
both cultivate personal relationships and spread patronage. They provide a conduit
though which candidates act on voters’ physic and material interests.
Competing explanations
Several factors other than the introduction of a candidate-centric system could explain
the decisive shift observed in campaigns from 2009 onwards. One of these is decentra-
lization. After the 1999 election, an extensive decentralization programme was
implemented across Indonesia, offering substantial revenue and expenditure autonomy
at the sub-provincial district level (Kabupaten/Kota). It is possible that the availability of
more revenues at the local level made candidates more attentive to local ethnic and
DEMOCRATIZATION 13
Table 4. Impact of candidate-centric system on campaigns.
Events Endorsements Group appeals
Rel. Ind. Comb. Rel. Ind. Comb. Rel. Ind. Comb.
Candidate-centric rules 2.08*
(1.04)
1.81*
(0.77)
2.73**
(1.03)
1.10^
(0.64)
1.91*
(0.76)
1.54*
(0.63)
1.31**
(0.40)
2.07*
(1.04)
1.44**
(0.38)
Decentralization −1.55
(1.07)
– −1.77^
(1.06)
−0.30
(0.69)
– −0.54
(0.68)
−1.26**
(0.40)
−1.28
(1.08)
−1.24**
(0.39)
Number of parties −0.01
(0.01)
−0.01
(0.02)
−0.01
(0.01)
−0.01
(0.01)
0.00
(0.02)
−0.01
(0.01)
0.00
(0.01)
−0.01
(0.01)
0.00
(0.01)
Islamic party −1.16
(0.75)
−1.20
(1.05)
−1.21^
(0.62)
−0.19
(0.51)
−0.48
(0.78)
−0.34
(0.47)
1.70**
(0.29)
−1.81^
(1.03)
1.54**
(0.29)
Constant −2.32**
(0.46)
−3.88**
(0.84)
−2.12**
(0.42)
−2.45**
(0.47)
−4.07**
(0.86)
−2.22**
(0.42)
−0.87**
(0.28)
−2.57**
(0.51)
−0.82**
(0.27)
Log likelihood −93.21 −57.12 −119.93 −102.79 −60.20 −123.50 −206.07 −86.62 −217.91
Pseudo-R2 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.03 0.08 0.05 0.10 0.08 0.09
Observations 367 299 367 367 299 367 367 367 367
*p < 0.05.
**p < 0.01.
^p < 0.10.
Note: Rel. = Religion; Ind. = Indigenous; Reg. = Regional; Comb. = Combined. Values are logit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The absence of indigenous events and endor-
sements in the 2004 reports posed some convergence problems for the corresponding logit models. Those observations were dropped (N = 299) and the decentralization variable was
subsequently omitted due to collinearity.
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community needs in the elections after 1999. Second, the number of parties has fluctu-
ated from one election to the next. An election with numerous parties might create
incentives for parties to appeal to smaller indigenous groups, whereas the presence of
fewer parties could foster appeals to larger groups based on religion or social class.
Finally, the ideology of parties – specifically, whether they are Islamic or secular-nation-
alist in nature – may affect campaigns. Potentially, shifts in the proportion of Islamic
parties from one election to the next could increase or decrease the frequency of
Islamic appeals.
To account for these competing explanations, I ran regressions on the religious and
indigenous aspects of campaigns and included decentralization, the number of parties,
and the Islamic or nationalist orientation of parties as controls. I set the decentralization
variable at 1 for all election reports after the introduction of decentralization (the 2004,
2009 and 2014 elections) and 0 otherwise (the 1997 and 1999 elections). Number of
parties represents how many parties competed in each election. The Islamic party vari-
able was coded as 1 for each report from an Islamic party and 0 for those from secular-
nationalist parties.38 For events I created a “combined” dependent variable which
encompassed reports with religious or indigenous events. The same was done for
endorsements and group appeals. This facilitated more tests on the impact of candi-
date-centric rules on the politicization of ethnicity.
Table 4 shows that in these regressions all the variables for candidate-centric rules
were positive and statistically significant. Meanwhile, the control variables did not
have a systematic impact and were largely insignificant. Alternative regression
models also indicated that candidate-centric rules had a significant impact on all reli-
gious and indigenous aspects of campaigns (see the supplementary materials).
Overall, in line with the argument, the data indicate that the rise in religious, indigenous
and community-oriented aspects of campaigns was associated with a shift to a more
candidate-centric system. Moreover, this change cannot be attributed to decentraliza-
tion, the number of parties or their Islamic or nationalist orientation.
Conclusion
The findings from this article have important implications for institutional design and
our understanding of ethnic politics. They move beyond simplistic views on ethnic
manipulation by elites, macro-level arguments on democratization, or debates on PR
versus majoritarian systems. Instead, they focus on how institutional change can
affect political boundaries and structure candidates’ campaign strategies, determining
whether candidates are guided from above by national party leaders or appeal more
intently to local groups within their electoral district.
Whereas others have emphasized the impact of institutional change on political
boundaries and ethnic politics, specifically studying the effect of candidate-centric
rules is important for two reasons.39 First, in terms of theory, it clarifies how political
boundaries affect ethnic politics. The introduction of candidate-centric rules is a
clear example of an institutional change that shrinks boundaries; it also opens up
new lines of enquiry. Does the change in political boundaries affect what identity
groups, or categories, become politicized? Moreover, does politicization vary depending
on the level of group attachment, their degree of internal organization or the relative
size of groups within the political boundaries? It should be noted that the empirical
findings from this article are confined to candidates, not voters, so future work
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would need to be done on how candidate-centric rules and campaigns might affect
ethnic politicization among voters.
The second reason for studying the impact of candidate-centric rules on ethnic poli-
tics is more practical and policy-relevant. In recent years, institutes and development
organizations like the World Bank have been pushing for greater political decentraliza-
tion, particularly in developing countries where ethnicity is salient. This decentraliza-
tion usually involves direct local elections, often under candidate-centric rules, with
the aim of increasing local accountability and strengthening personal connections
between voters and their representatives. The evidence from Indonesia suggests that
candidate-centric rules do indeed reduce the distance between candidates and the
people: candidates have become the main protagonists in election campaigns, and con-
stituents are provided with more information about and have more time to engage with
candidates. However, a more ominous trend accompanies this pattern. This study’s
findings also indicate that candidate-centric rules can motivate candidates to shore
up their support through exclusively indigenous or religious appeals and campaign
strategies. Evidence suggests that this pattern of appeals has occurred to some degree
in the highly candidate-centric district head elections in Medan in 2011 and again in
Jakarta in 2017.40
Fortunately, ethnicization in Indonesian election campaigns has not directly resulted
in any significant inter-ethnic electoral violence to date. Ethnic politics has remained
localized and quite fragmented, resisting the development of deep and enduring clea-
vages. But additional comparative work is warranted to consider whether the present
findings are also observed in other countries and to identify any contingent factors
that might make candidate-centric electoral systems particularly prone to inter-
ethnic violence. This is a critically important issue at a time when major global organ-
izations are pushing political decentralization as a solution to governance issues in
developing nations around the world.
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11. Other literature on constitutional engineering focuses on how proportional electoral rules (PR)
politicize ethnicity while majoritarian rules can depoliticize ethnicity. Unfortunately, the empiri-
cal evidence for this argument is mixed, see Huber, “Measuring Ethnic Voting.”
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Shugart, “Incentives to Cultivate Personal Vote”; Samuels, “Incentives to Cultivate Party Vote.”
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Barrel Politics”; Shugart, Valdini, and Suominen, “Looking for Locals.”
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15. Pomper, “Ethnic and Group Voting.”
16. In reality, Golkar party leaders could alter the lists at any time, providing them with even more
power over candidates. See King, Half-Hearted Reform, 29.
17. Aspinall, Opposing Suharto; Robison and Hadiz, Reorganising Power in Indonesia.
18. To prevent the formation of indigenous parties that would appeal to regionally concentrated
indigenous groups, the rules required parties to have a party apparatus across the country.
See Aspinall, “Democratization and Ethnic Politics,” 296.
19. A semi-open list was used in 2004. Voters could choose a party or candidate, but in order for a
candidate to get elected out of order they needed to get enough votes to equal or surpass a full
party quota. Only two DPR candidates succeeded in winning the full quota.
20. For a detailed explanation of the sequencing and slow pace of institution building in Indonesia,
see Horowitz, Constitutional Change.
21. For example Basedau et al., “Ethnicity and Party Preference”; Houle, “Does Ethnic Voting Harm
Democracy?”; Huber, “Measuring Ethnic Voting”; Posner, Institutions and Ethnic Politics.
22. Other data sources include radio and television reports, online sources, and party or candidate
campaign literature. Unfortunately, these sources suffer from a severe lack of available archives
on past elections. The available data are often patchy, difficult to compare and limited to only
the most prominent politicians or parties. This is a common problem in developing countries
with information-poor environments.
23. Previous studies of newspaper reports have highlighted each of these features (campaign events:
Horowitz, “The Ethnic Logic of Campaign Strategy”; candidate endorsements: Kahn and
Kenney, “The Slant of the News”; ethnic appeals: Chandra and Wilkinson, “Measuring the
Effect of Ethnicity”; Kuenzi and Lambright, “Campaign Appeals”; candidates’ attributes:
Balmas and Sheafer, “Candidate Image in Election Campaigns”; issues: Sulkin, “Campaign
Appeals”). While systematic studies of Indonesian campaign reports are rare, Indonesian
regional newspapers have become a major source for databases on incidences of conflict. See
Varshney, Tadjoeddin, and Pangabean, “Creating Datasets.”
24. This insight comes from several informants in Indonesia who were either directly involved in
campaigns or are close observers of Indonesian elections.
25. This point was made by a number of campaign managers and journalists in North Sumatra and
other regions of Indonesia.
26. On ethnicity, nationalism, and modernization in North Sumatra during the colonial and post-
colonial era, see Liddle, Ethnicity, Party, and National Integration.
27. Bowen, Islam, Law, and Equality; Davidson and Henley, The Revival of Tradition in Indonesian
Politics; Fealy and White, “Introduction.”
28. Purdey, Anti-Chinese Violence in Indonesia. On ethnic riots during the transition in other eth-
nically diverse districts, see Toha, “Political Competition.”
29. During the New Order, media analysts considered Medan’s Waspada and Mimbar Umum
dailies as major successes in terms of their longevity and independence (Hill, The Press in
New Order Indonesia, 119). The province’s press flourished after 1999. Journalist sources esti-
mated that 120 newspapers were being published in the province by 2010.
30. The codebook is available from the author’s website at www.colmfox.com.
31. Aliran originates from Clifford Gertz’s writings on the three cultural streams of Javanese people.
See Ufen, “From Aliran to Alignment,” on aliran and how it relates to the Indonesian party
system before and after the fall of Suharto.
32. Often the participants may have been of a particular ethnic or religious group, but if the affilia-
tion was not explicitly mentioned in the article I coded it as “community.”
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33. Quotas were introduced to boost female representation. See Shair-Rosenfield, “The Alternative
Incumbency Effect.”
34. Waspada introduced a special section of interviews with women candidates in 2009, entitled
Kasih Caleg Perempuan (“Affection for Female Candidates”). These new candidates often
emphasized the importance of voting for a female leader, the struggle for gender equality,
and efforts to empower women and help female entrepreneurs.
35. Studies on Indonesia’s highly candidate-centric district and provincial elections introduced in
2005 also found that candidates reached out to indigenous, religious, and local community
groups to a relatively high degree in their campaigns. See the edited volume, Erb and Sulis-
tiyanto, Deepening Democracy in Indonesia?
36. For examples on the expressive nature of voting see, Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict;
Schuessler, “Expressive Voting.” They argue that voting is about affirming your ethnic or pol-
itical identity and not about instrumental consequences.
37. Aspinall, “Parliament and Patronage,” describes how these gifts take the form of donations to
associations, gifts to voters, or vote-buying.
38. The main Islamic parties were Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, Partai Kedadilan Sejahtera,
Partai Bulan Bintang and Partai Bintang Reformasi. See the supplementary materials for a
full list of parties.
39. Posner, Institutions and Ethnic Politics.
40. Aspinall, “When Religion Trumps Ethnicity”; Aspinall, “Interpreting the Jakarta Election.”
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